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3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAAMental images arise from perceptual representations 
that are created from stored information—not from infor-
mation currently being registered by the senses. According 
to one theory, such images arise “when a representation of 
the type created during the initial phases of perception is 
present but the stimulus is not actually perceived” (Koss-
lyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006, p. 4). And, in fact, many 
previous studies have documented functional similarities 
between visual mental imagery and perception; these stud-
ies have relied on comparing behavior during imagery and 
perception tasks (e.g., Denis, 1991; Finke, 1985; Koss- 
lyn, 1980; Paivio, 1986; Perky, 1910; Segal & Fusella, 
1970; Shepard & Cooper, 1982), evaluating the effects of 
brain damage on how well patients perform the two types 
of tasks (e.g., Basso, Bisiach, & Luzzatti, 1980; Bisiach 
& Luzzatti, 1978; Farah, 1984; Farah, Levine, & Calvanio, 
1988), and comparing recordings of activation in the brain 
while participants engage in the two types of tasks (e.g., 
Ganis, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2004; Ghaëm et al., 1997; 
Ishai, Ungerleider, Martin, & Haxby, 2000; Kosslyn & 
Thompson, 2003; Kosslyn, Thompson, & Alpert, 1997; 
Mellet et al., 2000).
However, some findings have challenged the claim that 
visual mental imagery and visual perception rely on com-
mon underlying representations. For example, Behrmann, 
Winocur, and Moscovitch (1992) reported that a brain-
damaged patient with a left homonymous hemianopia 
and a possible bilateral thinning of the occipital lobes (as 
revealed by positron emission tomography and magnetic 
resonance imaging) had disrupted object recognition but 
intact visual mental imagery. Moreover, Guariglia, Pa-
dovani, Pantano, and Pizzamiglio (1993) reported the 
reverse dissociation in a patient who had a large lesion 
involving the right frontal lobe and the anterior tempo-
ral lobe. Denis and Kosslyn (1999), Ganis et al. (2004), 
Kosslyn (1994), and others (see Craver-Lemley & Reeves, 
1987, 1992) have suggested that this double dissociation 
between visual imagery and visual perception arises be-
cause forming an image relies on top-down processes that 
are not always necessary in perception, whereas visual 
perception relies on bottom-up organizational processes 
that are not required in visual imagery. Nevertheless, we 
note that if a familiar object is seen under degraded condi-
tions (i.e., an object is partially occluded or an object is 
seen under poor lighting conditions; see Ganis, Schendan, 
& Kosslyn, 2007), then top-down processing is likely to 
be used in visual perception. In such circumstances, visual 
mental imagery would not necessarily be more disrupted 
than perception following damage to brain areas involved 
in top-down processing.
These conjectures are consistent with the fact that not all 
of the same brain areas are activated during visual mental 
imagery and visual perception (Ganis et al., 2004; Koss-
lyn et al., 1997). For example, Ganis et al. (2004) found 
less overlap in activation during imagery and perception 
in the occipital and temporal lobes than in the frontal and 
parietal lobes—a result that they interpreted as indicating 
that perception relies in part on bottom-up organizational 
processes that are not used as extensively in imagery.
In the present study, we focused not on functional over-
lap between imagery and perception (which centers on 
how the content of the stored information is processed 
regardless of the format of the representation itself), but 
on possible structural overlap between the underlying rep-
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tions; this view predicts that metric distance per se would 
not affect scanning times—a prediction that was shown 
to be incorrect by Kosslyn et al. (1978) and others (e.g., 
see Kosslyn, 1994). A second counterinterpretation of the 
scanning results relies on the “tacit knowledge” that par-
ticipants have about visual processes (Pylyshyn, 1981). In 
particular, people may believe that visual scanning between 
successive fixation points takes more time with longer dis-
tances between the points. If so, then such knowledge may 
guide their responses in image scanning tasks, and the RTs 
would say nothing about the nature of the underlying rep-
resentation. The present investigation bears on this theory.
An underlying assumption in image-scanning studies is 
that the same, relatively low level type of representation 
is used in imagery and perception (cf. Finke, 1985). If the 
same perceptual representations are used in visual mental 
imagery and perception, then one would expect similar 
results when participants scan an object in an image and 
when they scan the object during perception. However, 
this comparison has never been studied systematically or 
in depth. If similar results are obtained in the two condi-
tions, then such findings would add a new piece of evi-
dence that imagery does, in fact, rely on representations 
that depict information; by “depict,” we mean representa-
tions in which: (1) each part of the representation corre-
sponds to a part of the represented object, so that (2) the 
distances between representations of the parts (in a rep-
resentational space) correspond to the distances between 
the parts on the object itself. Depictive representations 
are qualitatively distinct from the sorts of descriptive rep-
resentations that underlie language (see, e.g., Pylyshyn, 
1973, 2002, 2003; for a review, see Kosslyn et al., 2006).
Although Beech (1980), Denis and Cocude (1989), 
Intons-Peterson (1983), and Jolicœur and Kosslyn (1985) 
compared image scanning and visual scanning, none of 
these studies compared image scanning and scanning an 
iconic image. Given that iconic image representations in-
disputably arise at a low level of processing in the visual 
system, showing strong similarities between scanning 
mental images and scanning iconic images would pro-
vide important information about the nature of mental 
image representation. Moreover, such a finding would 
further demonstrate that mental imagery is a distinct type 
of representation, as opposed to what Pylyshyn (2002, 
2003) claimed.
In addition, none of the previous studies examined im-
agery and perceptual scanning (both during free view and 
based on iconic images) in the same participants. This 
comparison is crucial if we are to compare the scanning 
times in the two tasks. In the present studies, we examined 
whether the two types of scanning times are correlated; if 
the mental image representations share the spatial proper-
ties of the perceptual representations of the corresponding 
objects, then we would expect a high correlation between 
the slopes (increases in time with distance) in the differ-
ent tasks. If a person scans quickly in one task, then he 
or she should scan quickly in the others. Furthermore, if 
a person scans slowly in one task, then he or she should 
scan slowly in the others. The goal of Experiment 1 was 
to compare the scanning abilities of the same group of 
resentations (which focuses on the nature of the represen-
tations). Specifically, we investigated the possibility that 
visual imagery and perception rely on the same type of 
representation of the spatial layout of surfaces. Hypoth-
esizing that visual imagery and perception rely on the 
same type of spatial representation is plausible in light of 
facts about the neural architecture of the visual system. In 
particular, the first cortical areas that process visual input 
are topographically organized: The spatial layout of the 
surfaces of objects is represented by the spatial layout of 
the patterns of activation on the cortex (see, e.g., Tootell, 
Silverman, Switkes, & De Valois, 1982). Thus, we can ask 
whether there is evidence that the same spatial properties 
constrain the processing of visual mental images and vi-
sual percepts.
In this study, we relied on an image-scanning paradigm 
that was introduced by Finke and Pinker (1982) and re-
fined by Borst, Kosslyn, and Denis (2006). In this task, 
participants see a pattern of dots. After a short period of 
time, the dots disappear, at which point an arrow appears 
and the participant indicates whether the arrow would have 
pointed at a dot (if the dots were present as they had ap-
peared initially). Researchers typically find that the time 
to make this decision increases with the distance between 
the arrow and dot—a result that has been taken to reflect 
image scanning (as is also subjectively reported). A crucial 
characteristic of this paradigm is that participants are never 
instructed to form or scan a mental image at any time; thus, 
the scanning effect (i.e., a linear increase in response times 
[RTs] with increasing distances) cannot be attributed to 
either experimenter expectancy effects or task demand ef-
fects (see Kosslyn et al., 2006).
The imagery scanning paradigm was designed to reveal 
information about the spatial structure of the representa-
tions that are processed. That is, in image scanning para-
digms, RTs are used as a kind of “mental tape measure” 
to assess structural properties of the underlying represen-
tation. If mental images are in some sense pictorial, then 
space in the representation should embody actual space. 
If so, then the time to scan from one point to another on 
an object in a mental image should reflect the distance be-
tween the points. Consequently, as the distances between 
the points increase, RTs should also increase. Numerous 
researchers (e.g., Borst et al., 2006; Denis & Cocude, 
1989; Dror & Kosslyn, 1994; Finke & Pinker, 1982, 1983; 
Kosslyn, 1973; Kosslyn, Ball, & Reiser, 1978; Pinker, 
1980; Pinker, Choate, & Finke, 1984) have reported a lin-
ear increase in RTs with increasing distances scanned over 
objects in mental images. The conclusion of these studies 
was that the spatial structure of the representations un-
derlying imagery affects the way that they are processed. 
Thus, the behavioral data have been used to infer structural 
properties of the representation itself—not simply how it 
functions to improve memory, interferes with certain sorts 
of processing, or the like.
However, researchers who subscribe to a propositional 
theory (e.g., Pylyshyn, 1973) have proposed a different in-
terpretation of the scanning effect. According to this view, 
the results in scanning experiments reflect the amount of 
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participants received either pay or course credit. Their average age 
was 22 years, 4 months; 31 were right-handed, 5 were left-handed. 
All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Data from 4 ad-
ditional people were not analyzed because 2 reported having fol-
lowed the instructions less than 75% of the time, and 2 performed 
at least one of the tasks at chance levels of performance. All of the 
participants provided written consent and were tested in accordance 
with national and international norms governing the use of human 
research participants. The research was approved by the Harvard 
University Institutional Review Board.
Materials
We created three configurations of four black dots that were 7 mm 
in diameter (0.5º visual angle) in a 19  19 cm (14.4º  14.4º visual 
angle) white square surrounded by a black frame. Pattern 2 was cre-
ated by vertically flipping Pattern 1, and Pattern 3 was created by 
rotating Pattern 1 20º clockwise and then flipping it horizontally. A 
set of 48 arrows—2 cm in length (1.7º visual angle)—was also cre-
ated; 24 arrows pointed directly at the center of one of the dots and 
24 missed all of the dots by more than 40º. Each arrow was placed 
at one of six possible distances from the target (or nearest target) 
dot. They ranged from 1.5 to 9 cm, with 1.5-cm increments of dif-
ferences in distance. For each dot, six arrows pointed at it for each 
of the six different distances. Because we were concerned that scan-
ning along the horizontal or the vertical axis could affect the rate of 
scanning—especially in the perceptual conditions—no arrows were 
strictly horizontal or vertical. Each of the four arrows for a given 
distance was oriented at one of four possible angles (20º, 40º, 60º, 
or 80º). In some cases, the exact angles could not be achieved for a 
given arrow; hence, the angle could vary 5º from the four values. 
For example, arrows at 20º could be oriented from 15º to 25º relative 
to the horizontal axis.
We chose the locations of the 24 yes arrows (which pointed at a 
dot) so that the six distances to be scanned were independent of the 
angles of disparity between the direction of the arrow (pointing at a 
target dot) and the nearest alternative dot. The correlation between 
the distances and the angles was nonsignificant [r(22)  .22]. Thus, 
as the distance increased between the tip of the arrow and the target 
dot, alternative dots did not become more crowded. Consequently, 
because we designed the arrows to preclude “perceptual crowding” 
(Pylyshyn, 2002), such an explanation could not account for an in-
crease in RTs with increasing distances. Similarly, for the no arrows 
(which missed all of the dots by more than 40º), when the distances 
between the arrows and the dots increased, the angle with which the 
arrows missed the dots did not systematically vary [r(14)  .17]. 
This correlation was calculated only on 16 of the 24 no arrows, be-
cause 8 of them missed the dots by more than 90º; hence, no distance 
could be associated with them.
Finally, we placed the arrows and dots within a virtual circle with 
a 9-cm radius in order to discourage the participants from using the 
black frame as a reference for memorizing the positions of the dots. 
The set of arrows was submitted to the same spatial transformation 
(rotation and flipping) as the one used to create the corresponding 
patterns of dots, which enabled us to have the exact same distances 
for each pattern of dots. The stimulus patterns are illustrated in Fig-
ure 1. Stimuli were presented on a 17-in. monitor with resolution of 
1,280  1,024 pixels and a refresh rate of 75 Hz.
participants during visual perception, iconic memory, and 
visual mental imagery.
EXPERIMENT 1
We administered three scanning tasks. First, in the men-
tal image scanning task (hereafter referred to as the MI 
task), a pattern of dots was presented on each trial (this 
was done in order to keep the procedures in the three tasks 
as comparable as possible, even though the participants 
had memorized this pattern earlier); then, a mask was 
flashed to eliminate any iconic image of the dots. Finally, 
an arrow was presented. Participants visualized the pattern 
of dots to decide whether the arrow pointed at a location 
that had been previously occupied by one of the dots. The 
backward masking procedure we used has been shown in 
many previous studies to eliminate iconic images (see, 
e.g., Becker, Pashler, & Anstis, 2000; Coltheart, 1983; 
Enns & Di Lollo, 2000; Gegenfurtner & Sperling, 1993).
Second, in the free visual scanning task (hereafter re-
ferred to as the FV task), a pattern of dots and an arrow re-
mained on the screen until the participants decided whether 
the arrow pointed at one of the dots; thus, no mental image 
was required to perform this task. The FV task served in 
part as a “no mental image” control condition.
Third, in the iconic image scanning task (hereafter re-
ferred to as the II task), a pattern of dots with an arrow 
was presented very briefly, and participants scanned the 
distances based on an iconic image. The pioneering work 
of Sperling (1960) and subsequent studies (e.g., Avons & 
Phillips, 1980; Francis, 1996; Wede & Francis, 2006) have 
shown that the brain has the capacity to store for a short 
time (a few hundred milliseconds) a large amount of visual 
information. Given their short duration, residual iconic im-
ages should be able to support perceptual scanning briefly. 
We administered this task primarily to allow us to consider 
the possible “level” at which image scanning occurs in the 
nervous system. This task was also intended to control for 
possible effects of eye movements on the scanning rate (see 
Bahill & Stark, 1979; Fuchs, 1976). On each trial, partici-
pants were instructed to maintain their gaze on a fixation 
point in the center of the screen during the presentation of 
the pattern of dots. Posner, Nissen, and Ogden (1978) re-
ported that when asked to maintain their gaze on a fixa-
tion point, participants were able to prevent eye movements 
on 94% of the trials. In addition, because saccades take 
between 150 msec and 350 msec to initiate (Kelley, Ser-
ences, Giesbrecht, & Yantis, 2008; Wilimzig, Schneider, & 
Schöner, 2006), presenting the stimuli for only 250 msec 
would have allowed—at most—a single eye movement.
In all three tasks, we recorded RTs and error rates 
(ERs). In order to compare the results obtained in the three 
scanning tasks, we matched the materials used in the three 
tasks (equivalent spatial relations between the dots, equiv-
alent distances to scan, and equivalent arrows).
Method
Participants
Thirty-six volunteers from Harvard University and the local com-
munity participated in this study (18 females and 18 males). All  Figure 1. Patterns of dots used in the scanning tasks.852        BORST AND KOSSLYN
Group 1 (18 participants), the order was MI, FV, and II; in Group 2 
(18 participants), this order was reversed.
Participants were asked to follow the written instructions dis-
played on the screen. A 5-min break was provided between each 
task. At the end of the experiment, participants completed a debrief-
ing questionnaire to ensure that they had no idea of the purpose of 
the experiment and that they followed the instructions at least 75% 
of the time in each of the tasks.
MI task. We began by showing the participants the pattern of dots 
on a hard-copy printout, and we asked them to draw the locations 
of the dots from memory on a blank sheet of paper, with the empty 
19  19 cm black frame printed on it. We printed a hard copy of each 
of the original patterns on transparency sheets. In order to compare 
their drawings with the original pattern, participants superimposed 
the transparency on their drawings. Participants were asked to cor-
rect their drawings without the transparency and to then superim-
pose the transparency a second time. The draw-and-study procedure 
was repeated until all dots were drawn within 0.35 cm of their actual 
location. Depending on the participant, 1–7 drawings were required 
to reach this criterion. The draw-and-study procedure was an at-
tempt to ensure that all participants started the task having the same 
knowledge of the positions of the dots; thus, the participants’ ability 
to memorize the dots during the course of the task would not affect 
individual differences in RTs or ERs. The participants were told that 
they would be cued to visualize this pattern.
On each trial of the task itself (as illustrated in Figure 2), a fixa-
tion point first appeared in the middle of the screen for 1 sec. The 
pattern of four dots then appeared for 2 sec, which cued the par-
Procedure
The participants were tested individually, sitting 75 cm from a 
computer screen. Each participant performed the MI, FV, and II 
tasks. A given participant performed the three conditions with a sin-
gle pattern of dots on all trials in a given task. However, the pattern 
of dots was different in each of the tasks. We counterbalanced over 
participants which configuration of dots was used for each task.
In each task, participants first performed a practice block of 48 
trials. The computer provided feedback, and trials on which there 
were errors were repeated at the end of the block. Then, in each 
task, six blocks of 48 experimental trials were presented with no 
feedback, and trials on which there were errors were repeated at the 
end of each block. The order of the trials was randomized, except 
that no more than three yes or three no trials could occur in a row. 
The onset of the arrow started a timer, which was stopped when one 
of the two response keys was pressed. RTs and the nature of the 
response were recorded.
Because we were interested in the correlations among slopes, we 
needed to test the participants in the same experimental situation. 
However, to compare the mean slopes of the best-fitting lines, we 
had to counterbalance the order of the tasks. In a pilot study, we 
observed that the participants’ scanning efficiency in the II task 
correlated most strongly with their scanning efficiency in the MI 
task; thus, to avoid possible transfer of general processes between 
these tasks (which potentially could have accounted for the correla-
tions), we chose to administer the FV task between the two tasks that 
were exhibiting the strongest correlation in the pilot study. Thus, 
we assigned participants to one of two counterbalancing groups. In 
250 msec 1,000 msec 2,000 msec 100 msec Until
Response
Mental Image Scanning Task
250 msec 1,000 msec 1,000 msec Until
Response
Free Visual Scanning Task
250 msec 1,000 msec 250 msec Until
Response
Iconic Image Scanning Task
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made. Prior to the analyses, we eliminated outliers, which 
were defined as RTs greater than 2 SDs from the mean of 
that distance for that participant. In the yes trials, we also 
considered RTs under 250 msec as outliers, because such 
times could not have reflected the cognitive processes of 
interest (i.e., the scanning processes). Outliers occurred 
on 4.2% of the trials in the MI task, and on 3.1% in the two 
visual scanning tasks. Finally, trials on which participants 
made errors were repeated on average 1.11 times.
Yes trials. In order to discover whether we replicated 
previous findings, we first averaged the RTs over the trials 
for each distance in each task for each participant; then, 
we conducted separate ANOVAs on data from the three 
tasks. In the MI task, we found that different distances 
between the tip of an arrow and the previous location of 
a target dot required different amounts of time to scan 
[F(5,175)  13.47, p  .0005]. As is evident in Figure 3, 
the best-fitting linear function calculated by the method of 
least squares revealed that RTs increased linearly with dis-
tance [F(1,35)  62.89, p  .0005]. The Bravais–Pearson 
correlation between times and distance was r(4)  .93, 
p  .01. These results replicated those reported by Finke 
and Pinker (1982, 1983) and suggest that participants did 
use image scanning to perform this task.
We conducted the same analysis on the data from the FV 
task and found that RTs varied for the different distances 
[F(5,175)  56.55, p  .0005]. Moreover, RTs increased 
linearly with increasing distance [F(1,35)  125.07, p  
.0005]; as is shown in Figure 3, RTs were correlated with 
distance [r(4)  .99, p  .01]. These results are consistent 
with those reported by previous studies, even though we 
used a different scanning paradigm, which confirmed the 
robustness of the scanning effect (Beech, 1980; Denis & 
Cocude, 1989; Pinker, 1980).
Finally, in the II task, we processed the data as follows: 
We included the 250 msec of presentation of the stimulus 
in the RTs to take into account the possibility that some 
participants could have started to scan before the offset of 
the stimulus. In addition, we did not include RTs from tri-
als in which participants responded in less than 250 msec, 
ticipants to form the image after the mask (multiple black crossing 
lines on a white background; see Figure 2); the mask was displayed 
for 100 msec in order to disrupt any residual iconic image. Follow-
ing this, an arrow appeared on the screen in the black frame and 
remained visible until the participants responded (see Figure 2). The 
participants were instructed to decide as quickly and accurately as 
possible whether the arrow pointed to a location previously occupied 
by one of the dots. If so, they were to press one key with their domi-
nant hand (labeled with a “Y” on a green sticker); if not, they were 
to press the other key with their other hand (labeled with a “N” on 
a red sticker). At the beginning of the task, an example of a yes trial 
was presented by simultaneously displaying the pattern of dots and 
an arrow that pointed at one of them.
FV task. The task and procedure were the same as those in the 
MI task, except that the participants did not memorize the pattern in 
advance. The trial structure was as follows: On each trial, a fixation 
point was presented in the center of the screen for 1 sec; the pattern 
of four dots then appeared for 1 sec in the 19  19 cm black frame; 
an arrow appeared along with the dots in the frame and remained 
visible until one of the response keys was pressed (see Figure 2).
II task. The task and procedure were the same as those in the FV 
task, except that the pattern of dots appeared along with an arrow 
in the 19  19 cm frame, and this display was visible for 250 msec 
before it disappeared (but the outside square frame remained vis-
ible; see Figure 2). We presented the dots and the arrow simultane-
ously because we were concerned that, given the short duration of 
the presentation of the stimuli, displaying the arrow after the dots 
could have masked them. If so, this would have introduced spatial 
imprecision, which would in turn have contaminated our estimates 
of the scanning times.
Results
As a first step, we analyzed RTs and ERs to determine 
whether we replicated earlier findings of studies that used 
this scanning paradigm. Following this, we compared the 
steepness of the slopes of the best-fitting lines, the height 
of the intercepts, and the ERs in the three tasks. We then 
analyzed the relationship between individual differences 
in performance of the three tasks.
Preliminary analyses did not reveal any effect of—or in-
teraction with—gender or the specific patterns. The order 
of the tasks also did not affect the results, except for the 
height of the intercept in the II task. This was higher in 
Group 2, which performed the II task first [M  509 msec 
for Group 2, as compared with M  445 msec for Group 1; 
t(34)  3.64, p  .005]. We found no effect of the order of 
the tasks on the other measures. Although we did not use 
the full range of possible counterbalancing orders, the fact 
that we found virtually no differences between the most 
extreme orders—formed by switching the first and last 
tasks—is strong evidence that neither practice nor fatigue 
greatly affected the results. Thus, we pooled the data for 
the two counterbalancing groups, as well for males and fe-
males and for the different patterns, and we will not address 
these factors in the following description of the results.
Analysis of RTs and ERs
We analyzed separately the RTs from correct responses 
on yes and no trials, because we expected participants to 
scan the entire distances in the yes trials, but not always 
to do so in the no trials; that is, when it became obvious 
that the trajectory was going to miss a dot, participants 
may simply have stopped scanning, and we had no way 
to estimate at what point such a judgment may have been 
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Figure 3. Experiment 1: The times to scan increasing distances 
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are processed at a low level in the visual system; thus, the 
processes that operate on this representation should be 
more “automatic” and hence faster than the “controlled” 
processes that operate on visual mental images.
Intercepts. In addition, as is evident in Figure 3, an 
analysis of the height of the intercepts revealed differ-
ences among the tasks [F(2,70)  121.10, p  .0005]. 
The specific comparisons indicated that the mean inter-
cept was higher in the MI task (M  864 msec) than in the 
FV task (M  537 msec) [t(35)  10.96, p  .0005] or in 
the II task (M  477 msec) [t(35)  11.67, p  .0005]. 
Finally, the mean intercept also differed between the two 
perceptual tasks [t(35)  4.75, p  .0005]. As was noted 
when we discussed results from the II task, in order to 
account for the fact that participants could have started 
to scan before the offset of the stimulus, the presentation 
time of the display (250 msec) was included in the RTs. 
Consequently, the average height of the intercepts in the II 
task was, in fact, 227 msec (M  477  250 msec). This 
result is consistent with the duration of iconic memory as 
reported in the original research of Sperling (1960) and 
subsequent studies (e.g., Avons & Phillips, 1980; Francis, 
1996; Wede & Francis, 2006).
The difference between the heights of the intercepts in 
the II task and the MI task is crucial because it demon-
strates that the backward masking procedure did, in fact, 
eliminate iconic images in the MI task; only if iconic 
images are eliminated would participants need to create 
a mental image in order to scan. If iconic images were 
scanned in both tasks, then the heights of the intercepts 
should have been the same—but they were not. More-
over, iconic images are retained for only a few hundred 
milliseconds, but participants started to scan on average 
864 msec after the mask in the MI task; this finding also 
speaks against the participants performing the MI task by 
scanning an iconic image.
ERs. Finally, we compared the ERs on the yes and the 
no trials in the three tasks. Participants made different 
numbers of errors in the different tasks [F(2,70)  25.10, 
p  .0005]. Specifically, they made more errors in the MI 
task (M  6.4%) than in the FV task (M  3%) [t(35)  
5.87, p  .0005]. In the FV task, the pattern of dots and 
the arrow were presented simultaneously; thus, the judg-
ments were easier than they were when the pattern of dots 
was not physically present on the screen. Furthermore, 
participants made more errors in the II task than in the FV 
task [t(35)  6.46, p  .0005]. One explanation for this 
finding is that the II task required greater attention than 
the FV task because of the brief time that the dots and the 
arrow were presented (250 msec). However, the partici-
pants made comparable numbers of errors in the MI and 
II tasks (M  6.2%) [t(35)  1.39, n.s.].
Correlational Analyses
In order to consider whether the same scanning pro-
cesses were tapped in each of the three tasks—as was sug-
gested by the analysis of the average RTs and ERs—we 
examined the correlation between all dependent variables. 
If the same underlying scanning processes—applied to 
the same types of representations—were used in all three 
which allowed us to remove trials in which scanning 
could have been completed while the stimulus was pres-
ent. RTs again varied with distance [F(5,175)  79.1, p  
.0005], and RTs increased linearly with increasing dis-
tance [F(1,35)  173.88, p  .0005]. As is illustrated in 
Figure 3, we again found a strong positive correlation be-
tween scanning times and distance [r(4)  .98, p  .01]. 
These results are of great interest not only because they 
provide evidence that even with limited eye movements 
(at most, one saccade), participants were able to scan the 
distances between the tip of an arrow and a target dot, but 
also because they provide a first hint that mental image 
representations may be similar to iconic image represen-
tations. It should be noted that the participants reported 
during the postexperiment debriefing that they did not use 
mental images in the two perceptual tasks (FV and II).
No trials. We excluded from our analysis 8 of the 24 ar-
rows because they missed the dots by more than 90º, and we 
could not associate the arrows with a specific distance. The 
16 remaining arrows were assigned to one of two groups 
of 8 arrows: Half were less than 4 cm from the nearest yes 
dot and half were more than 5 cm from the nearest yes dot. 
There was no effect of distance on the no RTs in any of the 
three tasks [F(1,35)  1, n.s., in the MI task; F(1,35)  1, 
n.s., in the FV task; and F(1,35)  1, n.s., in the II task]. 
The lack of effect of distance on the RTs in the no trials is 
probably a result of the fact that we designed the arrows to 
miss all the dots by more than 40º; thus, the discrimination 
was very easy. Participants were faster on the no trials than 
on the yes trials, both in the II task (with means of 306 vs. 
551 msec, respectively) [t(35)  19.92, p  .0001] and in 
the MI task (862 vs. 942 msec, respectively) [t(35)  4.25, 
p  .0005]. However, in the FV task, participants were not 
significantly faster on the no trials than they were on the 
yes trials (with means of 607 vs. 624 msec) [t(35)  1.09, 
n.s.]. Thus, in the MI task and the II task, given the angles 
chosen, participants did not necessarily need to scan to de-
cide whether the arrow missed the dots; we suggest that a 
fast attentional process (distinct from imagery) could be 
sufficient to make the necessary discrimination. Given that 
RTs did not increase with distance in the no trials for the FV 
trials, we cannot infer that participants scanned during these 
trials; instead, the participants may simply have “double-
checked” the no trials when the pattern was in free view in 
order to ensure that the arrow did, in fact, miss the dots. If 
so, they would not be faster for no trials, but they also would 
not require more time with longer distances. However, if a 
smaller angle had been chosen, we would have probably 
observed an increase of the RTs with increasing distance 
(as reported by Finke & Pinker, 1982, 1983).
Slopes. To examine the similarity of the scanning pro-
cesses in the three tasks, we directly compared the slopes 
of the best-fitting lines from each of them. Thus, we cal-
culated the slope for each participant in each task and 
submitted these slopes to an ANOVA. The mean slopes in 
all three tasks were comparable [F(2,70)  1.74, n.s.; the 
mean for MI  16 msec/cm, FV  17 msec/cm, and II  
14 msec/cm]. In short, we had evidence that participants 
scanned at the same rate during imagery and perception. 
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finding is consistent with our findings from no trials, 
which were noted earlier.
Intercepts. The intercepts were also related, with the 
following correlations: MI and FV [r(34)  .57, p  .01], 
FV and II [r(34)  .43, p  .05], and II and MI [r(34)  
.35, p  .05]. When corrected for attenuation, we found 
the following correlations: MI and FV [r(34)  .61, p  
.01], FV and II [r(34)  .48, p  .01l], and II and MI 
[r(34)  .37, p  .05]. However, the intercepts and the 
slopes were not related in the FV task [r(34)  .27, n.s.] 
or in the II task [r(34)  .24, n.s.]. For the MI task, the 
correlation between slopes and intercepts just reached sig-
nificance [r(34)  .43, p  .05].
Finally, using Steiger’s (1980) equation—based on 
Fisher’s (1921) z transformation of the coefficient of 
  correlation—the correlation (corrected by attenuation) be-
tween the slopes in the MI and II tasks was stronger than 
between the correlation (corrected by attenuation) between 
the intercepts in these two tasks (z  2.97, p  .005). How-
ever, the same comparison of the correlation between the 
slopes and the intercepts on the MI task and the FV task 
revealed no significant difference (z  1.54, n.s.).
On the basis of this pattern of correlations, we infer that 
the intercepts reflect the participants’ efficiency on com-
mon general processes that cannot account for participants’ 
scanning efficiency (which is reflected by the slopes).
ERs. We also correlated the error rates in the three 
scanning tasks: MI and FV [r(34)  .51, p  .01], MI 
and II [r(34)  .64, p  .01], and FV and II [r(34)  
.73, p  .01]. When corrected by attenuation, the correla-
tions were: MI and FV [r(34)  .53, p  .01], MI and II 
[r(34)  .67, p  .01], and FV and II [r(34)  .74, p  
.01]. In addition, we observed correlations between the 
ERs and the height of the intercepts in the two perceptual 
tasks [r(34)  .47, p  .01, for the FV task, and r(34)  
.49, p  .01, for the II task]. Thus, these two indices 
were affected by a speed–accuracy trade-off. However, in 
the MI task, ERs and the height of the intercepts were not 
correlated [r(34)  .13, n.s.], which ruled out a speed–
accuracy trade-off on the intercepts.
Finally, we did not find significant correlations between 
the ERs and the slopes of the best-fitting lines in any of the 
tasks, then we would expect high correlations between 
the slopes. For each participant, we considered four mea-
sures for each of the three scanning tasks: (1) the slope of 
the best-fitting lines, (2) the intercept, (3) the correlation 
coefficient between RTs and distance, and (4) the ER. We 
checked split-half reliability for each measure. Critically, 
the slope measures were all reliable [MI, r(34)  .73; FV , 
r(34)  .82; II, r(34)  .79, all ps  .01]. Reliability 
coefficients for the intercept and the ERs ranged from .90 
to .99 (all ps  .01). However, we found low reliability 
for the correlation coefficients between RT and distance 
[r(34) ranging from .26 to .38]. The lack of reliability of 
the coefficient of correlations between RTs and distances 
may have simply reflected the higher sensitivity of this 
index to outliers. Given this finding, we did not analyze 
these correlations further. The correlations between all de-
pendent variables are presented in Table 1.
Slopes. We next obtained the correlation coefficients 
for the slopes of the increases in RT with distance in the 
three tasks: MI and FV [r(34)  .59, p  .01], MI and II 
[r(34)  .62, p  .01], and FV and II [r(34)  .70, p  
.01]. We then calculated the correlation coefficients cor-
rected by attenuation [rxy  rxy/ Ô(r Ôxx ÔÔ ryy Ô); see Spearman, 
1907], which is an estimate of what could be the relation-
ship between two tasks if the two measures were perfectly 
reliable, and we found the following correlations: MI and 
FV [r(34)  .76, p  .01], MI and II [r(34)  .81, p  
.01], and FV and II [r(34)  .87, p  .01]. Finally, we used 
Williams’s (1959) modified Hotelling t test to compare the 
correlation coefficients between the slopes in the three 
scanning tasks. The correlation (corrected by attenuation) 
between the slopes in the two perceptual tasks was no 
stronger than the correlation between the MI and II slopes 
[t(33)  1.11, n.s.]. However, the correlation between the 
FV and II slopes was stronger than the correlation between 
the MI and FV slopes [t(33)  2.09, p  .025].
The pattern of correlations suggests that although the 
participants’ scanning speed in the mental imagery task 
is predicted well by their scanning speed over an iconic 
image, the process of scanning a pattern in free view 
is affected by at least some different factors than those 
used to scan mental images and iconic images. This 
Table 1 
Experiment 1: Matrix of Correlations
Slope Intercept Coefficient Error Rate
    Task   MI   FV   II   MI   FV   II   MI   FV   II   MI   FV   II
Slope MI 1.00 0.59** 0.62** 0.43** 0.31 0.03 .27 0.28 0.33 .17 0.32 0.24
FV 1.00 0.70** 0.65** 0.27 0.07 .09 0.52** 0.47** .07 0.31 0.25
II 1.00 0.52** 0.50** 0.24 .19 0.25 0.44** .07 0.38* 0.30
Intercept MI 1.00 0.57** 0.35* .23 0.21 0.15 .13 0.40* 0.23
FV 1.00 0.43** .07 0.19 0.08 .04 0.47** 0.32
II 1.00 .25 0.15 0.25 .17 0.31 0.49**
Coefficient MI 1.00 0.18 0.11 .04 0.08 0.11
FV 1.00 0.26 .18 0.08 0.02
II 1.00 .01 0.04 0.09
Error rate MI 1.00 0.51** 0.64**
FV 1.00 0.73**
II 1.00
Note—Slope, slope of the best-fitting line; Intercept, intercept at the ordinate; Coefficient, coefficient of correlation between times and distances to 
scan; MI, the mental image scanning task; FV, the free visual scanning task; II, the iconic image scanning task.  *p  .05.  **p 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from the tip of the arrows to the location of the dots, pre-
sumably because the arrows appeared at unexpected loca-
tion (following the procedure of Finke & Pinker, 1983, 
Experiment 1).
In Experiment 1, by showing not only that the slopes 
(reflecting the increase in the time to scan increasing 
distances) are comparable within the same participants, 
but also that scanning abilities are strongly correlated 
between the perceptual scanning conditions (FV and II 
tasks) and image scanning condition, we have provided 
evidence that the underlying representations share the 
same spatial structure.
However, one could also argue that the correlation be-
tween the slopes in the MI and FV task is an artifact of 
how participants moved their eyes. In fact, Brandt and 
Stark (1997) and Laeng and Teodorescu (2002) showed 
that eye movements occur during visual mental imagery 
and that the sequence of fixations during imagery is simi-
lar to the sequence of fixations during perception. How-
ever, when they compared the performance of participants 
in two different learning conditions (free eye exploration 
vs. fixation), Laeng and Teodorescu found no difference 
in participants’ performance. Thus, eye movements per se 
could not have been responsible for spatial memory (as 
noted by Mast & Kosslyn, 2002). Moreover, the fact that 
in our Experiment 1 the slopes were correlated to the 
same extent in both the MI versus FV comparison and 
the MI versus II comparison (where—at most—a single 
eye movement was possible), speaks against a major role 
of eye movements in the present tasks. Although saccade 
duration does increase with saccade distance (see, e.g., 
Rayner, 1998), given the range of distances scanned in our 
tasks, such an increase would not produce the longer RTs 
for longer distances we found in the II task.
In addition, if overall speed or general processes (re-
flected by the intercepts) were responsible for the correla-
tions of the slopes, we would have expected the intercepts 
to be as highly correlated as the slopes. However, the cor-
relation between the MI and the II slopes was higher than 
the one for the intercepts in these two tasks. Moreover, no 
significant correlations were found between the slopes 
and the intercepts in the perceptual scanning tasks. The 
correlation found between the slopes and the intercepts 
in the imagery task was probably due to the fact that the 
intercept in this task reflects the time to generate the 
image. In conclusion, we want to argue that the intercepts 
reflect general processes (such as the speed of information 
processing during encoding the patterns and producing 
responses), whereas the slopes of the best-fitting lines re-
flect the efficiency of scanning per se.
Of particular note, the correlations between the slopes 
provide evidence that the same process is used to scan 
iconic images and visual mental images—which implies 
that a comparable type of representation is processed in 
the two cases. That is, a given type of process is only ap-
propriate for representations that have compatible charac-
teristics. Iconic images are clearly represented spatially, 
hence, if a process appropriate for scanning such repre-
sentations is also used in mental imagery, this implies 
that mental image representations share certain structural 
three tasks. Thus, the efficiency of the scanning process 
per se was not affected by a speed–accuracy trade-off.
Discussion
In all three tasks, the time to scan increased linearly 
when distance between the arrow and the dots increased 
on the trials in which arrows were actually pointing at tar-
get dots. We interpreted these results as reflecting the time 
to shift the point of attention across a spatial representa-
tion. These findings are of theoretical importance for at 
least three reasons: First, a theory that posits that scanning 
iconic images takes place at “lower” levels in the nervous 
system than scanning mental images would predict dif-
ferences in slopes (in fact, we find the comparable slopes 
in the two conditions very counterintuitive). Second, a 
propositional theory—of the sort proposed by Pylyshyn 
(1973)—would not predict an increase in times with in-
creasing distance in the mental imagery task, given that 
only metric distance is varied (and that “perceptual crowd-
ing,” which will be discussed shortly, cannot explain the 
results). Third, the “tacit knowledge” theory—later cham-
pioned by Pylyshyn (1981)—would not predict compa-
rable times to scan a mental image and an iconic image; 
the iconic image scanning condition in our experiment is 
a laboratory task that was never previously encountered 
by the participants; hence, they presumably would have no 
tacit knowledge of how to behave in this task. Moreover, 
postexperiment debriefing revealed than none of the par-
ticipants expected a relationship between time to scan and 
distance in the iconic image scanning condition, nor were 
they aware of our interest in this relationship.
We wish to infer that the present results implicate 
a common representation that is processed in the three 
tasks. However, Pylyshyn (2002) proposed that “percep-
tual crowding” could account for the strong linear rela-
tionship between RT and distance in this imagery task. 
The argument is that as the distance increases between 
the arrow and target dot, alternative target dots become 
more crowded. If this is the case, then RTs increased not 
as an effect of scanning greater distances but because of 
the increased difficulty of discriminating the target dot 
from the remaining dots. An alternative version of this 
view is that the angle of the no trials and the nearest yes 
dots became smaller as distance increased, which would 
also make the discrimination (now between a yes vs. a no 
decision) increasingly difficult with increasing distance. 
Neither variant of this account is viable for our results, 
however, because we designed the stimuli so that the angle 
between the arrow direction and the nearest alternative dot 
did not become smaller with greater distance.
One could also argue that during the perceptual scan-
ning tasks (free visual and iconic image scanning), par-
ticipants were able to memorize the locations of the dots 
and, consequently, they performed the task without any 
visual stimulation. However, Finke and Pinker (1983) 
showed that when participants were told the location of 
the arrow in advance, they could perform accurately, but 
the scanning effect did not occur. The fact that we did find 
such scanning effects in the perceptual tasks indicates that 
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5 months; 35 were right-handed and 1 was left-handed. All reported 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Data from 5 additional people 
were not analyzed, because 2 reported having followed the instruc-
tions less than 75% of the time, and 3 performed at least one of 
the tasks at chance levels of performance. All of the participants 
provided written consent and were tested in accordance with na-
tional and international norms governing the use of human research 
participants. The research was approved by the Harvard University 
Institutional Review Board.
Materials
In the MI task, we used one of the three patterns of four black 
dots designed in Experiment 1 (Pattern 1, see Figure 1). In addition 
to the arrows used in Experiment 1, we designed five new sets of 48 
arrows (24 yes arrows and 24 no arrows). The new arrows respected 
the same set of constraints as those in Experiment 1 (i.e., they had 
the same size, the same set of distances for the yes arrows, and the 
same properties to preclude a possible “crowding effect”; no arrows 
were strictly horizontal or vertical, and all arrows were placed within 
a virtual circle with a 9-cm radius).
In the II task, we created 48 different patterns of four dots with 
the same characteristics as those in Experiment 1. None of these 
patterns were similar to the pattern of dots used in the MI task. For 
each pattern, we designed six arrows: Three pointed directly at the 
center of one of the dots (yes arrows) and three missed all the dots 
by more than 40º (no arrows). Each of the yes arrows was placed at 
one of six possible distances from a target dot, ranging from 1.5 cm 
to 9 cm, with 1.5-cm increments in increasing distance. Respecting 
the same constraints used in Experiment 1, we designed the 144 yes 
trials to preclude a “perceptual crowding” effect (Pylyshyn, 2002) 
[r(142)  .11, n.s.]. The no arrows also were designed with the same 
constraints as those in Experiment 1; thus, when the distance be-
tween the arrows and the dots increased, the angle with which the 
arrows missed the dots did not systematically vary [r(94)  .09, 
n.s.]. (We restricted the analysis to 96 of the 144 no arrows for which 
we could assign a distance.) We presented the stimuli on the same 
computer screen used in Experiment 1, with the identical brightness 
and contrast settings.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that used in the corresponding task in 
Experiment 1, except that participants performed practice blocks of 12 
trials. We counterbalanced the order of presentation of the two tasks.
MI task. As in Experiment 1, we used a draw-and-study proce-
dure that was repeated until all dots were drawn within 0.35 cm of 
their actual location in two consecutive trials. Participants required 
from 1 to 11 drawings to reach this criterion. Following learning, 
each test trial began with a fixation cross, which appeared in the 
middle of the screen for 2.5 sec. Participants were asked to visualize 
the dots at their exact locations, in the same form that they studied, 
without moving their eyes from the fixation cross. Following this, an 
arrow appeared on the screen in the black frame, remaining visible 
until the participants responded (see Figure 4). The participants were 
instructed to decide as quickly and as accurately as possible whether 
the arrow pointed to a location occupied by one of the dots they 
had memorized during the draw-and-study procedure, while keep-
ing their gaze focused on the fixation cross (note that no reference 
to scanning was ever made). All other aspects of the procedure were 
the same as those of the MI condition of Experiment 1.
II task. As opposed to the MI task, the participants did not memo-
rize the pattern in advance. On each trial, a fixation point was pre-
sented in the center of the screen for 1 sec; one of the 48 patterns 
of four dots then appeared for 125 msec in the 19  19 cm black 
frame; the pattern of dots then was replaced by an arrow in the black 
frame for 125 msec. Participants were instructed to keep their gazes 
focused on the fixation point in the middle of the screen at all times 
(see Figure 4). After the offset of the arrow, participants decided 
whether the arrow pointed at one of the dots. The participants used 
the same two keys that were used in the MI task to respond.
features with iconic image representations. Given the fact 
that visual information persists in primary visual cortex 
(V1) after display offset (see, e.g., Duysens, Orban, Cre-
mieux, & Maes, 1985; Engel, 1970; Supèr, Spekreijse, 
& Lamme, 2001), the relationship between the scan-
ning processes in these two tasks—although surprising 
and counterintuitive—supports the hypothesis that visual 
mental images rely on relatively low-level representations 
in the visual system.
However, several aspects of the tasks could have bi-
ased the results, and would have led us to overestimate the 
structural equivalence between perceptual representation 
and mental image representation. Experiment 2 addresses 
the key issues.
EXPERIMENT 2
One could argue that the iconic image scanning task did 
not, in fact, require participants to scan an iconic image. 
First, because we presented the dots and the arrow simul-
taneously and presented these stimuli for 250 msec, some 
of the participants conceivably could have scanned the 
pattern of dots itself and not an iconic image. Second, 
because we used a single pattern of dots on all trials in 
the II task, participants could have relied more on their 
long-term memory of the position of the dots than on their 
iconic image, per se.
In addition, one could question the design of the mental 
image scanning task of Experiment 1. First, it is possible 
that the mask did not entirely eliminate the iconic image of 
the stimulus. Second, participants could make eye move-
ments over the to-be-scanned pattern in the mental image 
scanning task, which could have affected the slopes of the 
increases in RT with distance.
In order to address these issues, in Experiment 2, we 
revised both the iconic image scanning task and the men-
tal image scanning task. In the II task, we presented the 
pattern for 125 msec and immediately replaced it by an 
arrow that was shown for 125 msec. In order to control for 
the possibility that the participant could have memorized 
the pattern of dots in the II task, we presented a different 
pattern of dots on each of the trials in a given experimental 
block. In the MI task, in order to ensure that participants 
did not rely on their iconic memory (which would have 
been possible if the mask were inadequate), we no longer 
displayed the pattern of dots on each trial. Instead, the par-
ticipants memorized the pattern of dots prior to the task 
and were asked to visualize the dots to decide whether an 
arrow would have pointed at one of them if they were on 
the screen as they appeared when memorized. Participants 
were instructed to keep their gaze focused on a fixation 
cross during the course of trials in both tasks in order to 
limit possible eye movements.
Method
Participants
Thirty-six volunteers from Harvard University and the local com-
munity participated in this study (24 females and 12 males). None 
of these volunteers participated in Experiment 1. All participants 
received either pay or course credit. Their average age was 23 years, 858        BORST AND KOSSLYN
We conducted the same analysis on the data from the II 
task and found that RTs varied for the different distances 
[F(5,175)  68.32, p  .0005]. Moreover, RTs increased 
linearly with increasing distance [F(1,35)  192.36, p  
.0005]; as shown in Figure 5, RTs were highly correlated 
with distance [r(4)  .95, p  .01]. These results are 
consistent with those reported in Experiment 1, and they 
suggest that participants scanned their iconic images to 
determine whether an arrow was pointing at a dot.
No trials. In both tasks, we analyzed the data from 96 
arrows for which we could assign a distance, and we pro-
cessed the data in the same way as in Experiment 1. There 
was no effect of distance on the no RTs [for both tasks, 
F(1,35)  1, n.s.]. As in Experiment 1, participants were 
faster on no trials in both the II task (with means of 433 vs. 
On each block of 48 trials, we designed the arrows for each of 
the 48 patterns of dots so that for the 24 yes arrows, each of the six 
possible distances between the tip of the arrow and the dots appeared 
four times. However, a pattern of dots was presented only once per 
block and was never associated with the same arrow in the six ex-
perimental blocks of trials. The order of the trials was randomized, 
except that no more than three yes or three no trials could occur in a 
row. All other aspects of the procedure were the same as those in the 
II task of Experiment 1.
Results
As a first step, we analyzed RTs and ERs in the same 
way as we did in Experiment 1. Preliminary analyses did 
not reveal an effect of gender or of the order of the tasks on 
all three dependent variables in both scanning tasks. Thus, 
we pooled the data over these variables, and we will not ad-
dress these factors in the following report of the results.
Analysis of RTs and ERs
We conducted identical analyses to those in Experi-
ment 1. Defining outliers as in Experiment 1, there were 
4.9% in the MI task and 2.8% in the II task. Trials on 
which participants made errors were repeated, on average, 
1.25 times.
Yes trials. In the MI task, we found different times to 
scan different distances from the tip of an arrow to a loca-
tion of a dot previously memorized [F(5,175)  13.07, 
p  .0005]. In addition, as shown in Figure 5, RTs in-
creased linearly with distance, as documented by the 
best-fitting function calculated by the method of least 
squares [F(1,35)  67.84, p  .0005]. RTs and distance 
were highly correlated [r(4)  .88, p  .01]. These results 
replicated those obtained in Experiment 1 and the results 
reported by Finke and Pinker (1982, 1983). The results 
suggested that participants scanned their mental image of 
the pattern of dots to evaluate the trials.
250 msec 1,000 msec 125 msec 125 msec Until
Response
Iconic Image Scanning Task
250 msec 2,500 msec Until
Response
Mental Image Scanning Task
Figure 4. Experiment 2: The procedures used in the two scanning tasks.
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In contrast with what we found in the MI task, the mean 
slopes in the II task did not differ between Experiment 1 
(M  14 msec/cm) and Experiment 2 (M  12 msec/cm) 
[t(70)  1.66, n.s.], nor did the ERs (M  6.2% in Experi-
ment 1 and M  5.3% in Experiment 2, t  1). These results 
suggest that even when the pattern of dots and the arrow 
were presented simultaneously (Experiment 1), an iconic 
image was used to perform the task as in Experiment 2.
Correlational Analyses
The logic of the correlational analyses was identical to 
that in Experiment 1: We expect high correlations between 
the slopes if, in fact, the same scanning process is used in 
both tasks. We considered the same four measures as we 
did in Experiment 1 for each participant on each task and 
checked the split-half reliability for each of them. Criti-
cally, the slope measures all were reliable [r(34)  .89, 
p  .01, for MI, and r(34)  .92, p  .01, for II]. Reli-
ability coefficients for the intercept and the ERs ranged 
from .95 to .99 (all ps  .01). And, unlike what we found 
in Experiment 1, the correlations between time and dis-
tances were reliable [r(34)  .70, p  .01, for MI, and 
r(34)  .75, p  .01, for II]. The correlations between all 
dependent variables are presented in Table 2.
Slopes. The slopes of the best-fitting lines in the II task 
were highly correlated with those in the MI task [r(34)  
.85, p  .01]. As in Experiment 1, we corrected the cor-
relation between the slopes for attenuation (Spearman, 
1907) and found that the slopes in the MI and II tasks 
were correlated extremely highly [r(34)  .94, p  .01]. 
Finally, we used Fisher’s (1921) z-transformation to com-
pare the correlation coefficients between the scanning 
tasks in Experiments 1 and 2. The correlation (corrected 
by attenuation) between the slopes in the MI and II tasks 
in Experiment 2 was stronger than the correlation between 
the MI and II slopes in Experiment 1 (z  2.48, p  
.01). By restricting eye movements in the MI task (as op-
posed to the procedure in Experiment 1), it seems that 
the relationship between participants’ scanning efficiency 
was strengthened. Not surprisingly, given these results, 
we found that the coefficients of correlation between time 
and distance in the MI and II tasks themselves were cor-
related [r(34)  .61, p  .01, and r(34)  .84, p  .01, 
when corrected by attenuation].
472 msec) [t(35)  2.52, p  .01] and the MI task (with 
means of 971 vs. 1,336 msec) [t(35)  4.06, p  .0005]; 
these results suggest that the participants did not need to 
scan to evaluate these trials.
Slopes. We compared the average slopes of the best-
fitting lines in the MI task with those in the II task to de-
termine whether participants scanned iconic images and 
mental images at the same rate. The mean slope in the MI 
task (M  25 msec/cm) was significantly steeper than the 
slope in the II task (M  12 msec/cm) [t(35)  5.58, p  
.0005]. The results suggest that participants in this experi-
ment scanned iconic images about twice as fast as they 
scanned mental images.
Intercepts. As reported in Experiment 1, the height of 
the intercept in the MI task (M  1,204 msec) was greater 
than the height in the II task (M  409 msec) [t(35)  
11.75, p  .0005]. This difference in the intercepts was 
expected because participants had to generate a mental 
image of the dots in the MI task, and this time is included 
in the height of the intercept.
ERs. We compared the ERs in the two scanning tasks 
on yes and no trials. Participants made fewer errors in 
the II task (M  5.3%) than in the MI task (M  9.7%) 
[t(35)  4.41, p  .0005]. As opposed to what we found 
in Experiment 1, the MI task of Experiment 2 was more 
difficult than the II task.
Comparison of Experiments 1 and 2. The different 
slopes, intercepts, and the ERs in the II and MI tasks re-
flect differences in the MI tasks of Experiment 1 versus 
Experiment 2. We found steeper slopes in the MI task in 
Experiment 2 (M  25 msec/cm) than in Experiment 1 
(M  16 msec/cm) [t(70)  2.68, p  .005]; the in-
tercept was higher in Experiment 2 (M  1,204 msec) 
than in Experiment 1 (M  864 msec) [t(70)  4.23, 
p  .0001], and the ERs were larger in Experiment 2 
(M  9.7%) than in Experiment 1 (M  6.4%) [t(70)  
2.28, p  .025]. One possible explanation of these 
differences is that when participants had to rely on their 
long-term memory of the dots (Experiment 2), the image 
was lower quality than it was when it was formed on the 
basis of a just-seen display (Experiment 1). And, be-
cause the image was degraded, the participants scanned 
it more slowly, required more time to generate it, and 
made more errors.
Table 2 
Experiment 2: Matrix of Correlations
Slope Intercept Coefficient Error Rate
    Task   MI   II   MI   II   MI   II   MI   II
Slope MI 1.00   .85**   .20   .06   .56**   .54**   .00 .02
II 1.00   .00   .02   .62**   .65** .04   .02
Intercept MI 1.00   .43** .41* .09   .19   .03
II 1.00 .10   .03   .20   .07
Coefficient MI 1.00   .61** .17 .09
II 1.00 .07   .04
Error rate MI 1.00   .57**
II 1.00
Note— Slope, slope of the best-fitting line; Intercept, intercept at the ordinate; Coefficient, coefficient of 
correlation between times and distances to scan; MI, the mental image scanning task; FV , the free visual 
scanning task; II, the iconic image scanning task.  *p  .05.  **p 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correlations between the intercepts and the fact that the 
intercepts were not correlated with the slopes.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The two experiments reported in the present article 
converge in showing that participants who were better at 
scanning distances perceptually were also better at scan-
ning distances across a mental image. The similarity of 
the slopes in Experiment 1 between the three scanning 
tasks led us to suggest that the underlying representations 
share structural properties. By the same token, the strong 
correlation of slopes between another version of the iconic 
and mental imagery scanning tasks in Experiment 2 is also 
consistent with the idea that the same type of representa-
tion was processed in the two tasks. In all cases, depic-
tive representations apparently were processed, which ac-
counts for the increased time to scan increased distances. 
In addition, the high correlations between scanning in the 
perceptual and mental imagery conditions are good evi-
dence that the same type of representation was processed 
in the two cases—particularly in light of the weaker cor-
relations with estimates of general processing speed.
The fact that the mental images were more difficult 
to scan in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1 suggests 
an intriguing hypothesis: Perhaps mental images that are 
generated on the basis of information stored in long-term 
memory are akin to a degraded iconic image. If so, then 
it should be possible to degrade the iconic image in small 
steps and to find a version in which the slopes match those 
in the mental imagery condition—a way to “externalize” 
the quality of a mental image. Indeed, this approach could 
lead to a new, objective way to assess individual differ-
ences in the quality of mental images.
However, the differences in the slopes in Experiment 2 
between the iconic image scanning task and the image 
scanning task introduce a note of caution. The steeper 
slopes observed in the mental imagery condition of Ex-
periment 2 could simply represent a slower scanning pro-
cess over the identical type of representation, which would 
make sense if the images generated from long-term mem-
ory are degraded (in comparison with those generated 
on the basis of perceptual input that was just encoded). 
Alternatively, these steeper slopes could indicate that the 
representation or processing is different in the two mental 
imagery conditions. Perhaps, for example, mental images 
generated from long-term memory are more fragmented 
than those generated on the basis of a just-seen stimulus, 
and part of the scanning process involves filling in miss-
ing material. If so, then image generation processes could 
play a more crucial role in the sort of scanning observed 
in Experiment 2 than the sort observed in Experiment 1. 
Nevertheless, the increase in time to scan increasing dis-
tance suggests that image representations depict informa-
tion, regardless of the quality of the image.
The depictive representations that are scanned are not 
likely to be implemented in the topographically organized 
cortical areas 17 or 18, for several reasons. First, Koss-
lyn, Ball, and Reiser (1978) found that the time to scan 
increases at the same rate between two points that were 
Intercepts. We also correlated the intercepts between 
the MI task and the II task [r(34)  .43, p  .01; when 
corrected by attenuation, the correlation was r(34)  .45, 
p  .01]. However, the intercepts and the slopes were not 
correlated, which suggests that the slopes and the inter-
cepts reflect different aspects of processing. Finally, the 
comparison of the coefficient of correlations between the 
slopes in the MI and II tasks and the intercepts in those 
tasks (using Fisher’s [1921] procedure) revealed that the 
slopes were more highly correlated than were the inter-
cepts (z  5.14, p  .0001). Taken together, the results 
indicate that the relationship between participants’ effi-
ciency in scanning a mental image and an iconic image is 
not driven by more general processes.
ERs. Error rates in the MI and II tasks were also corre-
lated [r(34)  .57, p  .01; r(34)  .58, p  .01, when cor-
rected by attenuation]. In contrast with Experiment 1, the 
ERs were not correlated with the slopes, intercepts, or with 
the coefficient of correlations (in each of the two scanning 
tasks), which rules out a speed–accuracy trade-off on all 
three measures. Most important for present purposes, the 
efficiency of the scanning process (revealed by the slopes) 
per se was not affected by a speed–accuracy trade-off.
Discussion
In the revised version of the mental image scanning task 
and the iconic image scanning task, as in Experiment 1, 
the time to scan increasing distances increased linearly 
as the distance between the tip of the arrows and the dots 
increased. In the II task, the average slopes of the best-
fitting lines and the error rates were comparable to those 
we obtained in Experiment 1. Thus, it is unlikely that par-
ticipants were engaged in a form of “memory scanning” 
during the II task of Experiment 1 (arising from the re-
peated presentation of the same pattern of dots); rather, it 
seems that participants scanned iconic images, as in Ex-
periment 2 (when new stimuli were presented on each trial 
of a given block). Furthermore, the similarity of the slopes 
in the II tasks of Experiments 1 and 2 supports the infer-
ence that participants did not begin to scan the stimulus 
before it was removed in the iconic image scanning task 
of Experiment 1.
In contrast, in the MI task, not only the slopes but also 
the height of the intercepts and the accuracy of responses 
were affected by requiring the participants to generate 
the image on the basis of information stored in long-term 
memory, as opposed to on the basis of a just-seen display. 
The pattern of results revealed that when participants cre-
ated the to-be-scanned image from long-term memory 
(Experiment 2), the task was more difficult than when the 
pattern was encoded immediately prior to generating the 
image (Experiment 1).
In addition, in Experiment 2, the participants scanned 
at different rates in the MI and the II tasks. Nevertheless, 
scanning abilities were strongly correlated between the 
iconic image scanning condition and the mental image 
scanning condition, which is consistent with the idea that 
the same processes were at play in both sorts of scanning. 
Moreover, the correlations in slopes do not reflect more 
general aspects of processing, as reflected by the lower STRUCTURAL EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN VISUAL MENTAL IMAGES AND PERCEPTS        861
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